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The Choice of a New Generation:
Can an Advertisement Create a Binding
Contract?
Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Merchants who advertise their products generally intend to deal according
to the terms of their advertisements. For the most part, "Dealers of Goods" are
happy to receive offers induced by their advertisements.2 This would account
for why there are relatively few cases concerning whether advertisements can
create binding contracts. Only in unusual circumstances does a consumer seek
to establish that an offer was made by an advertisement, which if accepted would
create a contract.3 This Note evaluates one such unusual circumstance, and the
options a court faces in resolving that type of a disagreement.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
This dispute arose out of a promotional campaign conducted by PepsiCo,
Inc. ("PepsiCo").4 As part of the promotional campaign, entitled "Pepsi Stuff,"
consumers were encouraged to collect Pepsi Points from specially marked
packages of Pepsi and Diet Pepsi that could be redeemed for merchandise
featuring the Pepsi logo.' Before introducing the campaign nationwide, PepsiCo
began the Pepsi Stuff promotion by test marketing in the Pacific Northwest.6
1. 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, No. 99-9032, 2000 WL 381742 (2d
Cir. Apr. 17, 2000).
2. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRAcTs § 2.4,
at 122 (rev. ed. 1993).
3. Don F. Vaccaro, Annotation, Advertisement Addressed to Public Relating to Sale
or Purchase of Goods at Specified Price as an Offer the Acceptance of Which Will
Consummate a Contract, 43 A.L.R.3D 1102 (1996).
4. Leonard, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 117-18. PepsiCo, Inc. is the producer and distributor
of the soft drinks Pepsi and Diet Pepsi. Id. at 118.
5. Id.
6. Id. Test marketing took place from October 1995 through March 1996. Id.
1
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PepsiCo advertised the promotion in a television commercial7 and distributed
Pepsi Stuff catalogs to consumers in the test market area.'
John D.R. Leonard ("Leonard"), a resident of Seattle, Washington, saw the
Pepsi commercial for"Pepsi Stuff" and claimed that the commercial constituted
an offer for a Harrier Jet.9 The commercial showed a series of products with the
Pepsi logo and the respective number of Pepsi Points required to purchase
them.10 In the final scene of the commercial, a teenage boy is seen flying a
Harrier Jet to school." After he parks the jet on the playground and emerges
with a Pepsi in hand, the words "HARRIER FIGHTER 7,000,000 PEPSI
POINTS" appear on the screen." After having seen the Pepsi Stuff commercial,
Leonard was inspired and set out to obtain a Harrier Jet. 3 He consulted the
Pepsi Stuff Catalog and the attached Order Form. 14 Even though the Harrier Jet
was not shown in the catalog, Leonard claimed that, based on the television
commercial, the Jet was part of the promotion." According to the
accompanying directions for Pepsi Point redemption, each order had to contain
7. Id. The court describes the television commercial in detail. The commercial
opens in the morning with the appearance of a teenager preparing to leave for school.
Id. He is dressed in a shirt "emblazoned with the Pepsi logo" and the subtitle "T-SHIRT
75 PEPSI POINTS" scrolls across the screen. Id. The teenager walks down the hallway
wearing a leather jacket and the subtitle "LEATHER JACKET 1450 PEPSI POINTS"
appears. Id. The teenager opens the front door and puts on a pair of sunglasses and
simultaneously the subtitle "SHADES 175 PEPSI POINTS" is displayed. Id. A
voiceover then says, "Introducing the new Pepsi Stuff catalog," and the following
message appears at the bottom of the screen: "Offer not available in all areas. See details
on specially marked packages." Id. at 118 n.2. The close of the commercial shows the
teenager exiting a Harrier Jet that he flew to school and parked next to the bicycle rack.
Id. at 119. A voiceover says: "Now the more Pepsi you drink, the more great stuff
you're gonna get." Id. The helmetless teenager then appears in the cockpit of the Harrier
Jet and while holding a Pepsi exclaims, "Sure beats the bus." Id. At that point the words
"HARRIER FIGHTER 7,000,000 PEPSI POINTS" appear. Id. The commercial ends
with the text "Drink Pepsi-Get Stuff." Id.
8. Id. The Pepsi Stuff merchandise ranged from 15 Pepsi Points for a "Jacket
Tattoo" to 3300 Pepsi Points for a "Fila Mountain Bike." Id. The Order Form in the










Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/7
ADVERTISEMENTS AS OFFERS
at least fifteen original Pepsi Points, but more Pepsi Points could be purchased
for ten cents each, if needed to obtain a desired item. 6
Leonard originally set out to collect 7,000,000 Pepsi Points by consuming
Pepsi Products.17 It soon became clear to Leonard that it would be impossible
for him to purchase and drink enough Pepsi to earn the required number of Pepsi
Points during the limited time of the promotion.18 Leonard then realized that
buying Pepsi Points would be a better option. 9
In March 1996, Leonard submitted an Order Form20 with fifteen original
Pepsi Points and his check for $700,008.50.21 PepsiCo's fulfillment house
rejected Leonard's submission and returned his check in early May.u Leonard's
counsel responded with a letter demanding that PepsiCo's fulfillment house
transfer a new Harrier Jet to Leonard in compliance with the offer made in the
Pepsi Stuff commercial.' The next month, Leonard sent a similar demand letter
to PepsiCo.24
PepsiCo brought suit on July 18, 1996 in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York ("N.Y. Suit") to obtain a declaratory
judgment stating that it was not obligated to transfer a Harrier Jet to Leonard.25
On August 6, 1996, Leonard brought suit in Florida state court ("Florida
Action")26 as a response to PepsiCo's N.Y. Suit.' Leonard sought specific
16. Id. The directions also note that merchandise may be ordered "only" with the
original Order Form. Id.
17.Id.
18. Id. The court noted that to amass 7,000,000 Pepsi Points would require
drinking approximately 190 Pepsis a day for the next one hundred years. Id. at 129.
19. Id. at 129. Leonard ultimately raised approximately $700,000. Id.
20. Id. at 119. Leonard had written in "1 Harrier Jet" at the bottom of the "Item"
column on the Order Form and "7,000,000" in the "Total Points" column. Id.
21. Id. The check was drawn on an account of Leonard's first set of attorneys, and
thus it appears that counsel represented him at that time. Id.
22. Id. at 120. In a letter to Leonard, the fulfillment house explained:
The item that you have requested is not part of the Pepsi Stuff collection. It
is not included in the catalogue or on the order form, and only catalogue
merchandise can be redeemed under this program.
The Harrier jet in the Pepsi commercial is fanciful and is simply included to
create a humorous and entertaining ad. We apologize for any
misunderstanding or confusion that you may have experienced and are
enclosing some free product coupons for your use.
Id.
23. Id. The letter concluded with a threat of legal action if transfer instructions
were not received within ten (10) days. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The Florida court noted: "The only connection this case has to this forum
2000]
3
Cohen: Cohen: Choice of a New Generation:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
MISSOURLA WREVIEW
performance of the alleged offer for a Harrier Jet made by PepsiCo in the Pepsi
Stuff television advertisement.28 The Florida Action was removed to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, but on December 2,
1996, it was transferred to the Southern District of New York.
29
Leonard later moved to dismiss PepsiCo's declaratory judgment suit for
lack of personal jurisdiction.0 On November 24, 1997, the Court granted
Leonard's motion to dismiss, and Leonard simultaneously moved to voluntarily
dismiss his own action.3' On December 15, 1997, the Court granted Leonard's
motion for voluntary dismissal on the condition that Leonard pay certain legal
fees amassed by PepsiCo.32 When Leonard failed to pay legal fees, the Court
ordered him to either pay the fees or withdraw his voluntary dismissal and
continue litigation.33 Leonard chose to continue litigation and retained new
counsel.34 PepsiCo moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.35
Judge Wood of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted PepsiCo's motion for summary judgment on three separate
bases. 36 The Court held that an advertisement that fails to contain any "words
of limitation 37 or is not "clear, definite, and explicit"38 is merely an
advertisement to receive offers and not an offer in and of itself.39 Furthermore,
because the commercial sought a reciprocal promise, it was not a unilateral
offer.40 The Court concluded that based on the comical nature of the
is that Plaintiff's lawyer is in the Southern District of Florida." Id. at 120 n.4.
27. Id. at 120.
28. Id. at 117-18.
29. Id. at 120-21. United States District Judge Lawrence King found that the
Florida Action had been "filed in a form [sic] that has no meaningful relationship to the
controversy and warrants a transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)." Id. at 120.
30. Id. at 121.
31. Id.
32. Id. The court noted that "PepsiCo was entitled to some compensation for the
costs of litigating this case in Florida, a forum that had no meaningful relationship to the
case." Id. On October 1, 1998, Leonard was ordered to pay $88,162 in attorney's fees
within thirty days. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. In the current case, Leonard consented to the jurisdiction and PepsiCo
agreed not to seek enforcement of its award of legal fees. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 132.
37. Id. at 124.
38. Id. (quoting Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 86 N.W.2d 689,
691 (Minn. 1957)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 131.
[Vol. 65
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commercial, a reasonable person could not conclude that PepsiCo would be
giving away a Harrier Jet as part of its promotion.4' Finally, the Court rendered
its summary judgment decision on the conclusion that no writing existed




A. Advertisements as Offers
Although a valid offer to sell goods can be made by an advertisement, there
is a strong presumption against finding that an advertisement constitutes an
offer.43 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains the general rule that
advertisements are not ordinarily recognized as offers to sell." For an
advertisement to become an offer, it either has to contain specific language that
commits the advertiser to making an offer or language that invites a consumer
to act without further communication between the parties.45 Courts adhering to
this principle usually hold that advertisements do not constitute offers, but rather
are invitations to solicit offers.46
It is well established that an advertisement for the sale of goods does not
constitute an offer that can be accepted to create a binding contract.47 In Lovett
v. Frederick Loeser & Co.,48 a New York court noted that an advertisement is
not an offer but only an invitation to enter into negotiations.4 9 According to the
court, because an advertisement is not an offer, a consumer that articulates an
intention to purchase goods featured in an advertisement does not form a
41. Id. at 131.
42. Id.
43. See CORBIN & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.4, at 116.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (1979).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (1979).
46. SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 4:7, at 286-87 (4th ed. 1990).
47. See Mesaros v. United States, 845 F.2d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Arnold
Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 571-72 (3d Cir. 1986);
Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 539 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1038, overruled on other grounds by Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842
F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1988); Amalgamated Clothing Workers, AFL-CIO v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 307 F. Supp. 422, 424 (N.D. II1. 1969); Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v.
Masters Mail Order Co., 140 F. Supp. 165, 172 (D. Md. 1956); Lovett v. Frederick
Loeser & Co., 207 N.Y.S. 753, 755 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1924).
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contract.50  The court recognized that the general test for whether an
advertisement constitutes an offer is whether, based on the facts, it can be shown
that an affirmative promise of performance was made in exchange for something
requested in the advertisement. 51 The court concluded that, in general, an
advertisement directed to all persons is considered a solicitation by the advertiser
to receive offers. 2
The use of an attached order form does not transform an advertisement into
an offer. 3 In Mesaros v. United States,' an advertisement for commemorative
coins included an order form, but the court found that it is well established that
advertisements coupled with order forms are merely advertisements and thus
invitations to receive offers from consumers.55 In accordance with the basic
rules of contracts, the court then looked at the objective reasonableness of the
consumer's belief that the advertisement was intended as an offer.56 The court
found it unreasonable for a person to believe that an advertiser is bound by the
terms of an advertisement.57 The court stated that advertisers would be harmed
if they were bound by advertisements and solicitations for offers.5" For example,
advertisers could be held accountable for an excessive number of contracts
requiring them to provide more goods than are available in the market.
59
Consequently, most courts hold that unless accepted by the seller, purchase
orders and order forms are not enforceable contracts.60
In order to create an enforceable contract, the essential terms of the contract
must be specific.6' In Alligood v. Procter & Gamble,62 the court evaluated the
specificity requirement as applied to advertisements and solicitations. The court
determined that an advertisement printed on boxes of Pampers diapers informing
50. Id.
51. Id. at 756.
52. Id. at 756-57.
53. See Mesaros v. United States, 845 F.2d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
54. 845 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
55. Id. at 1580.




60. See Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534,538-39 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Hasbrouck
v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 26 cmt. d (1981).
61. See Alligood v. Procter & Gamble, 594 N.E.2d 668, 669 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
The court stated: "[E]ssential terms [include] the identity of the parties to be bound, the
subject matter of the contract, consideration, a quantity term, and a price tenn." Id.
62. 594 N.E.2d 668 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
[Vol. 65
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customers that they could collect attached "Teddy Bear points" and redeem them
to save money on merchandise in the separate "Pampers Baby Catalog" was not
specific enough to form an enforceable contract.63 The court suggested that even
considering the advertisement and the catalog together, no enforceable contract
was formed because the essential terms of the promotion were not specific.6
Collectively, the catalog and the advertisement on the package were an
invitation to consumers to order from the catalog, which could be revoked by the
company.
5
Occasionally, courts have found that an offer has been made in an
advertisement for the sale of goods.6 In Lejkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus
Store,67 the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed whether the advertisement was
"clear, definite, and explicit" to determine if it constituted an offer.68 The court
determined that a sufficient contract of sale can be achieved if the advertisement
shows, and the conduct of the parties demonstrate, a mutuality of obligation69
between the consumer and the advertiser.70 In Lejkowitz, the advertisement was
specific, detailing the quantity available, the number available per person, and
who could accept.71 Advertisements without words of limitation like "first-
come, first-served" are sufficiently different from Lefkowitz to not be considered
offers.72 A Louisiana court recognized in Johnson v. Capital City Ford Co.Y
that if the terms expressed in an advertisement are certain and definite enough
to create an offer when made orally, then they likewise form an offer when
communicated by an advertisement.74
63. Id. at 669.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See CORBIN & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.4, at 119; see Johnson v. Capital City
Ford Co., 85 So. 2d 75 (La. Ct. App. 1955); Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus
Store, 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957).
67. 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957).
68. Id. at 691. The court stated, "[W]here the offer is clear, definite, and explicit,
and leaves nothing open for negotiation, it constitutes an offer, acceptance of which will
complete the contract." Id.
69. A mutuality of obligation occurs when "some performance was promised in
positive terms in return for something requested." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The advertisement stated, "1 Black Lapin Stole Beautiful, Worth $139.50
... $1.00 First Come First Served." Id. at 690.
72. Mesaros v. United States, 845 F.2d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
73. 85 So. 2d 75 (La. Ct. App. 1955).
74. Id. at 79.
2000]
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B. Rewards as Offers
It is common to publicize a reward as a way to induce performance.'
Courts generally hold that these publications constitute unilateral offers and are
enforceable contracts.76 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. 77 was instrumental
in developing the law of unilateral or one-sided offers.78 In Carbolic Smoke
Ball, the developers of a medical preparation called the "Carbolic Smoke Ball"
issued an advertisement that induced Ms. Carlill to purchase the product and use
it as described in the advertisement to prevent contracting influenza. 9 Despite
using the ball as directed, Ms. Carlill was attacked by influenza and sued to
recover the reward promised in the advertisement.8 ° Justice Lindley construed
the advertisement as offering a reward and explained that these types of
advertisements are invitations for acceptance open to anyone who performs the
conditions named in the advertisement." Lord Justice Bowen demonstrated with
a common sense example 2 that the offeror implies in a unilateral offer that
75. See CORBIN & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.4, at 119.
76. Id. See Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1985); James v. Turilli, 473
S.W.2d 757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Las Vegas Hacienda v. Gibson, 359 P.2d 85 (Nev.
1961); Barnes v. Treece, 549 P.2d 1152 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976); Carlill v. Carbolic
Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q.B. 256 (Ct. App. 1893).
77. 1 Q.B. 256 (Ct. App. 1893).
78. See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 259,281-82
(1995). Unilateral offers are contracts in which only one party is under any obligation
to the other. Id. at 283. Although there is a promise by one party, there is no actual
agreement because the parties do not even meet until a reward is to be claimed and thus
the promise has been fulfilled. Id. at 282-83.
79. Carbolic Smoke Ball, 1 Q.B. at 257.
80. Id. The advertisement stated:
£100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person
who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused
by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks
according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. £1000 is deposited
with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.
During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls
were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was
the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball.
Id.
81. Id. at 262.
82. Lord Justice Bowen hypothesizes:
If I advertise to the world that my dog is lost, and that anybody who brings the
dog to a particular place will be paid some money, are all the police or other
persons whose business it is to find lost dogs to be expected to sit down and
write me a note saying that they have accepted my proposal?. . . The essence
of the transaction is that the dog should be found, and it is not necessary...
8
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notification of acceptance of the offer is not required to form a binding contract
in this type of reward case. 3 Lord Justice Bowen distinguished between the
offer of reward in Carbolic Smoke Ball and typical advertisements by explaining
that an offer of reward is an offer to reward anyone who performs the conditions
of the offer before it is retracted.' Thus, an offer of reward makes the offeror
liable based solely on the actions of one party. On the other hand, offers to
negotiate do not create binding contracts based on one party's
performance-they are merely offers to receive offers, and thus require both
parties bargaining to form a contract.
85
C. Objective Reasonable Person Standard
When evaluating the formation of contracts, courts are obligated to apply
"objective principles of contract law. '86 Thus, courts are not to consider the
subjective intent of the parties." Because contract law uses an objective
reasonable person standard, when a reasonable person would understand an offer
as a joke, it cannot be construed as an offer and does not form a contract.88
Alternatively, if it is not apparent that the offer was a joke and a reasonable
person would believe that a serious offer was being made, there may be a valid
offer that could form a binding contract.8 9 The real but unexpressed intentions
of the parties are unimportant.9° If a reasonable person would conclude that the
words and actions of the other party manifest an intention to be bound by the
contract, the agreement is enforceable.9
In Hubbard v. General Motors Corp.,92 the Southern District of New York
used the objective reasonable person standard to evaluate statements made by
General Motors in its commercial for the Suburban automobile.93 The court




84. Id. at 268.
85. Id.
86. See Kay-R Elec. Corp. v. Stone & Webster Constr. Co., 23 F.3d 55, 57 (2d Cir.
1994); Mesaros v. United States, 845 F.2d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
87. See Kay-R Elec. Corp., 23 F.3d at 57; Mesaros, 845 F.2d at 1581; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 21-23.
88. Barnes v. Treece, 549 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 518, 520 (Va. 1954).
91. Id.
92. No. 95 Civ. 4362, 1996 WL 274018, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996).
93. Id. at *6-7.
2000]
9
Cohen: Cohen: Choice of a New Generation:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW
concluded that a description of the vehicle that stated it was "like a rock,"
"popular," and "the most dependable, long-lasting truck on the planet" was mere
puffery, and that no reasonable consumer could rely upon these claims as
statements of fact.94 According to the court, generalized or exaggerated
statements are considered "puffing" by the advertiser and will not bind the
advertiser because a reasonable consumer would not rely on or interpret the
statements as factual claims.9
D. Statute of Frauds
Under U.C.C. Section 2-201(1), a writing evidencing a contract for sale is
a formal requirement in sales of goods in excess of five hundred dollars. 6 Many
states, including New York, use the same language included in U.C.C. Section
2-201. The writing requirement exists to prove that a real transaction is
involved, the terms of which are substantiated in writing rather than by oral
evidence alone.97
Multiple signed and unsigned writings may be combined to satisfy the
writing requirement so long as it is made clear in the writings that they involve
the same subject matter or transaction.98 In Horn & Hardart Co. v. Pillsbury
Co.,99 the Second Circuit noted that two threshold requirements must be satisfied
in order for multiple combined writings to satisfy the Statue of Frauds. 0 First,
when signed and unsigned writings are combined, the signed writing must
establish that the parties are involved in a contractual relationship.' Second,
the unsigned writing must clearly refer to the same subject matter or transaction
as set forth in the signed writing.'02
94. Id.
95. Id. at *6 (quoting In re All Terrain Vehicle Litig., 771 F. Supp. 1057, 1061
(C.D. Cal. 1991)).
96. The text of U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1989) reads as follows:
[A] contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient
to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and
signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized
agent or broker.
97. See U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (1989).
98. See Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 110 N.E.2d 551,554 (N.Y. 1953);
CORBIN & PERiLLO, supra note 2, § 23.3, at 771.
99. 888 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989).
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. (quoting Crabtree, 110 N.E.2d at 554).
102. Id. (quoting Crabtree, 110 N.E.2d at 554).
[Vol. 65
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In Leonard v. PepsiCo,' 3 a New York district court considered whether the
advertisement published by PepsiCo was an offer or merely an advertisement.'"
The court based its decision on the general rule that advertisements do not
constitute offers.'05 Citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,'" the court
stated that "[a]dvertisements ... are not ordinarily intended or understood as
offers to sell.' 07 The court then emphasized that New York courts adhere to this
general principle that advertisements are usually construed as invitations to
offer.'0" In evaluating the order form in the Pepsi Stuff catalog to determine if
it constituted an offer, the court based its decision on Mesaros v. United
States." Just like the Mesaros court,"0 the district court determined that
Leonard's order form, appropriate number of Pepsi Points, and check for
$700,008.50 constituted the offer."' No enforceable contract could be created
until PepsiCo accepted the offer and cashed Leonard's check."2
The court then distinguished this case from Lejkowitz"3 by determining that
the commercial and catalog published by PepsiCo were not "clear, definite, and
explicit" and contained no "words of limitation."'"14 The court said that the
commercial was not definite by itself because it reserved the details of the offer
to the catalog and the catalog did not even contain an offer for the Harrier Jet.' 5
The court also noted that the commercial was not definite because, unlike
Lejkowitz, the commercial by PepsiCo did not identify who could accept." 6
Finally, the court concluded that even if the catalog contained the Harrier Jet, the
103. 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), afj'd, No. 99-9032, 2000 WL 381742
(2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2000).
104. Id. at 122-24.
105. See COR1N & PERiLLO, supra note 2, § 2.4, at 116; Leonard, 88 F. Supp. 2d
at 122.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (1979).
107. Leonard, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 122.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing Mesaros v. United States, 845 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
1 l0. In Mesaros, a federal district court concluded that a breach of contract action
was improper because no contract could be formed until order forms were accepted and
payment was processed by the defendant. Mesaros, 845 F.2d at 1581.
111. Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aft'd, No.
99-9032, 2000 WL 381742 (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2000).
112. Id.
113. Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957).
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advertisement still would not constitute an offer because there were no "words
of limitation," like "first-come, first-served."'" 7 The court was swayed by the
Mesaros court's ruling that "words of limitation" are necessary to prevent the
advertiser from being bound by an excessive number of contracts and from being
responsible for providing more goods than are available."' Thus, the court in
Leonard concluded that neither PepsiCo's commercial nor catalog constituted
an offer.
119
After concluding that the commercial in Leonard was not an offer, but
merely an advertisement, the court distinguished advertisements from rewards.'
The court explained that in reward cases the alleged offer is "intended to induce
a potential offeree to perform a specific action, often for noncommercial
reasons[J" whereas typical advertisements are "invitation[s] to negotiate for
purchase of commercial goods.''. The court concluded that the Pepsi
commercial did not direct that anyone with the required amount of Pepsi Points
who showed up at Pepsi Headquarters would receive a Harrier Jet." Instead,
the commercial suggested that consumers refer to their Pepsi Stuff Catalog to
learn how to redeem the Pepsi Points they had accumulated." The court
suggested that by accepting and complying with the terms of the Order Form, the
commercial sought a reciprocal promise and therefore was not a reward case but
rather an advertisement to receive offers.24
The court concluded that no objective person could have reasonably
believed that the commercial was an offer for a Harrier Jet. 2 The court
emphasized that it could not consider PepsiCo's subjective intent in making the
commercial or evaluate Leonard's subjective view of the commercial because,
based on prior case law,'26 the court was to use the objective principles of
contract law. 12
7
In order to substantiate that no reasonable person could believe the
commercial was an offer for a Harrier Jet, the court concluded that the
117. Id.
118. Mesaros v. United States, 845 F.2d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
119. Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, No.
99-9032, 2000 WL 381742 (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2000).
120. Id. at 125-27.




125. Id. at 127.
126. See Kay-R Elec. Corp. v. Stone & Webster Constr. Co., 23 F.3d 55, 57 (2d
Cir. 1994); Mesaros v. United States, 845 F.2d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
127. Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, No.
99-9032, 2000 WL 381742 (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2000).
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commercial was "done in jest" and because it was not serious, no offer could
have been made.1 28 The court found that the commercial made exaggerated
claims like many commercials do,129 and that reasonable viewers would
understand these claims were not statements of fact, but were merely puffery.30
The court also decided whether the alleged contract satisfied the Statute of
Frauds.' 3 1 The court emphasized the writing requirement under N.Y.U.C.C.
Section 2-201(1) and found that there was no writing between the parties that
satisfied this requirement.3 2 The court evaluated the threshold requirements for
a writing under the Statute of Frauds and found that the commercial was not a
writing and that the completed Order Form did not bear PepsiCo's signature.
33
Consequently, the court concluded that there was no writing sufficient to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds.
34
In Leonard, the court concluded that summary judgment was proper for
three reasons. 35  First, the commercial was nothing more than an
advertisement. 36 Second, because of the comical nature of the commercial, a
reasonable person could not conclude that PepsiCo would be giving away a
Harrier Jet as part of its promotion. 37 Finally, the court found that there was no
128. Id. at 128, 130.
129. See Hubbard v. General Motors Corp., No. 95 Civ. 4362, 1996 WL 274018,
at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996).
130. Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d at 128. The court found many
reasons why it thought the commercial was "done in jest." Id. The court explained that
the teenager in the commercial was a "highly improbable pilot who could barely be
trusted with the keys to his parents' car, much less the prize aircraft of the United States
Marine Corps." Id. at 128-29. In addition, the court said that the idea of traveling to
school in a Harrier Jet is an unrealistic fantasy for teenagers and civilians in general. Id.
at 129. Finally, the court concluded that drinking enough Pepsi to acquire 7,000,000
Pepsi Points and obtain the Harrier Jet is an unlikely possibility. Id. The court wrote that
purchasing the Jet for $700,000 would have been a "deal too good to be true" because a
Harrier Jet costs roughly $23 million dollars. Id.
131. Id. at 131.
132. Id.
133. Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, No.
99-9032,2000 WL 381742 (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2000). The threshold requirements are that
a signed writing establish, by itself, a contractual relationship between the parties, and
that an unsigned writing refer to the same transaction as the signed writing if the two
writings are to be combined to establish a writing. See Horn & Hardart Co. v. Pillsbury
Co., 888 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989).
134. Leonard, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 131.
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The court's decision in Leonard fits well within the confines of existing
case law, 39 and strong policy considerations support the court's holding. By
following the general rule that advertisements are not construed as offers, but are
instead solicitations for offers, the court's decision in Leonard paves the way for
predictable outcomes in future controversies involving advertisements.
Although most prior case law involved advertisements in print'40 (either
published in the newspaper or in circulars), the Leonard decision is a more
modem approach applicable to other television commercial controversies or
perhaps even advertisements on the internet. The court's decision in Leonard
supports the use of advertisements to inform people about products and services.
As the court found in Mesards,14' if advertisements are considered offers,
advertisers could be "bound by an excessive number of contracts.., in excess
of amounts [of goods] available.' ' 42 If all publications by advertisers were
construed as offers to form contracts that could be accepted by anyone,
advertisers might refrain from advertising to avoid the costly consequences for
breach of contract.
Even though the court in Leonard determined that no contract existed
between the parties, the decision easily could have been different. The issues
presented in Leonard are a modem version of the century old Carlill v. Carbolic
Smoke Ball14 decision, in which the court upheld an advertisement as a
unilateral offer and maintained that the contract was enforceable. The court in
Leonard distinguished the television advertisement from a unilateral offer by
saying that the advertisement was not meant to induce specific action like reward
cases do.'4 In fact, the advertisement and the Pepsi Stuff promotion were
created to induce consumers to purchase Pepsi products. Accumulating Pepsi
Points and redeeming them for merchandise is not dissimilar from the "lost dog"
hypothetical posed by Lord Justice Bowen.' 4 Like that hypothetical, consumers
138. Id.
139. See supra note 47.
140. See supra note 47.
141. Mesaros v. United States, 845 F.2d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
142. Id.
143. 1 Q.B. 256 (Ct. App. 1893).
144. Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 125-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), affd,
No. 99-9032, 2000 WL 381742 (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2000).
145. See supra note 82.
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may actually accept PepsiCo's offer by collecting Pepsi Points and sending them
in for redemption without PepsiCo knowing about the acceptance until the
consumers are owed their reward. As in the "lost dog" hypothetical, PepsiCo
would have no basis for denying a consumer's request for reward merchandise
listed in the Pepsi Stuff catalog once the consumer satisfied the contest
requirements.
The court in Leonard decided that no reasonable person could conclude that
the television commercial was an offer for a Harrier Jet.146 In reaching this
conclusion, the court assumed that the objective reasonable person standard
ought to be from an adult's perspective. Had the court considered the
commercial from a reasonable teenager's perspective, the outcome may have
been entirely different. Persuasive authority suggests that courts should adapt
the objective reasonable person standard to fit the particular parties involved.'47
A compelling reason for adapting the objective reasonable person standard is
that the standard, on its surface, fails to address different perspectives and
vulnerabilities of different parties. 148 In cases involving sexual harassment or
hostile work environment claims, some courts have applied a reasonable women
standard in place of the traditional reasonable person analysis. 149 In a recent
controversial case involving racial harassment, a Maine court adopted a
reasonable black person standard. 50 Even more recently, the Ninth Circuit
decided that it is appropriate to use the standard of a reasonable person with the
same fundamental characteristics as the plaintiff."' Keeping these more
subjective standards in mind, consider that teenagers and children have different
perspectives than adults when reacting to advertisements. 52  After all, a
reasonable teenager might conclude that the Pepsi commercial in controversy
was an offer for a Harrier Jet because the Jet was advertised in the same manner
146. Leonard, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 130-31.
147. See generally Penny L. Cigoy, Harmless Amusement or Sexual Harassment?:
The Reasonableness of the Reasonable Woman Standard, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 1071 (1993).
148. Id. at 1093.
149. See Tortes v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1997); Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991); Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424, 428-29 (D.
Ariz. 1992).
150. See Harris v. International Paper, 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me.), vacated inpart
by 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991). But see Richardson v. New York State Dep't of
Correctional Serv., 180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999).
151. See Crowev. Wiltel Communications Sys., 103 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1996).
152. See Donald W. Garner & Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children From Joe
Camel and His Friends: A New First Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis of
Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 46 EMoRY'L.J. 479,535 (1997) (discussing of the effects
of tobacco advertising aimed at minors showing "a strong correlation exists between the
youth-oriented ads and the rate of consumption of those brands among minors").
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as the other Pepsi Stuff products. 53 Using a reasonable teenager standard may
have been appropriate, especially given that the commercial was targeted at
young, impressionable teens who were members of the "Pepsi Generation."
Finally, the court concluded that because there was no writing present, the
alleged offer did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds." While the court suggested
that a commercial is not a writing, it gave no explanation for this distinction.'55
To the contrary, many cases have held that nontraditional forms of "writing" are
sufficient to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. Messages conveyed
by telegram, 56 FAX, 57 and tape recording 58 have all been construed as meeting
the writing requirement under the Statute of Frauds. Under this analysis, the
television commercial in Leonard could have been analogized to the
aforementioned electronic media in order to meet the Statute of Frauds writing
requirement. Alternatively, the court could have broadly interpreted the writing
requirement so that the commercial would have been acceptable. Article 2 of the
U.C.C. is currently being revised. The current revisions to U.C.C. Section 2-201
imply a move toward accepting a broader interpretation of "writings." The
current revisions to U.C.C. Section 2-201 suggest replacing the "writing"
requirement with a "record" requirement so that as long as some tangible record
exists, the requirement is met.159 The television commercial would certainly
meet the record requirement currently under consideration.
153. See supra note 7.
154. Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, No.
99-9032, 2000 WL 381742 (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2000).
155. Id.
156. See generally Ryan v. United States, 136 U.S. 68 (1890); McMillan, Ltd. v.
Warrior Drilling & Eng'g Co., 512 So. 2d 14 (Ala. 1986); Kinney v. Horwitz, 105 A. 438
(Conn. 1919); Heffeman v. Keith, 127 So. 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Hillstrom v.
Gosnay, 614 P.2d 466 (Mont. 1980); Hansen v. Hill, 340 N.W.2d 8 (Neb. 1983); J.E.
Tarbell Co. v. Grimes, 149 A. 73 (N.H. 1930); La Mar Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Credit &
Commodity Corp., 216 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. City Ct. 1961); Hessenthaler v. Farzin, 564
A.2d 990 (Pa. 1989).
157. See John R. Thomas, Note, Legal Responses to Commercial Transactions
Employing Novel Communications Media, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1155 (1992).
158. See generally Londono v. Gainesville, 768 F.2d 1223 (11th Cir. 1985); Ellis
Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1972).
159. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revision of
Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2-Sales (visited May 9, 2000)
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/ucc2999.htm>. According to the revisions,
"'Record' means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in
an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." Id.
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When consumers and advertisers litigate the terms of an advertisement, the
court will often find, as did the Leonard"6 court, that an advertisement is not an
offer to sell. Consequently, advertisers are under no obligation to turn over the
goods mentioned in their advertisements. After Leonard, consumers have a
difficult burden to overcome. A decision to change the law so that a consumer's
acceptance of the terms of an advertisement will form a binding contract is truly
a choice for the next generation.
LINDSAY E. COHEN
160. Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), affid, No. 99-
9032, 2000 WL 381742 (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2000).
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